The California Grocery
Strike by Rich Gibson, May, 2004 "The greatest productive force is the
understanding, wisdom, of the revolutionary class itself." (Marx) 1. The
southern California
grocery strike involving 70,000 United Food And
Commercial Workers members from October 2003 to March 2004 was one of
the most
significant actions the U.S. labor movement took in the last twenty
years. 2. What
happened? The
workers lost, betrayed by their union leaders. This defeat was
devastating,
setting up a spiral of attacks on the lives of people who must work to
live,
particularly on the minimal health benefits that a few working people
still
have. The old labor saw, AAn injury to one just goes before an injury
to all,@ is already
felt in teacher-union contract negotiations. 3. Could
this have been won?
Yes, it could, but not within the confines of the law, and not in the
confines
of the structures of the unions, not within the philosophy of the
"labor
movement@ (i.e., the
AFL-CIO with the independent National
Education Association tossed in for good measure), not without
preparationCand most
importantly, not without organization and
wise action. 4. What
were the issues? The
70,000 plus grocery workers in Southern California, most but not all of
them
check-out clerks, struck to protect their wages, health benefits,
pension
funds, the hours and nature of the hours at work, and their union
itself. Grocery
clerks are not known as impatient militants. The workers fought because
they
had to fight. Cornered, they engaged in a battle that few of them fully
understood. The sole thing that was retained after the end of a five
month
strike was the right of their United Food and Commercial Workers Union
directors to collect dues from the members. 5. The
grocery owners, Vons,
Ralphs, and Albertsons,
claimed they had to have massive concessions from the union in order to
stave
off competition from Walmart, now invading
their
turf. The grocery bosses rightly said that Walmart=s edge was not only in its ability to buy
in bulk,
but its cheap labor costs. Walmart, the
largest
corporation in the world, pays health benefits to less than 2 of its work force, and often pays only
the minimum
wage to part-timers. In addition, Walmart
sometimes
just does not pay at all, having been sued repeatedly by employees who
were
unpaid for work done. 6. On the
other side,
grocery workers were trapped. Because their circumstances demanded it,
grocery
clerks led the biggest fight-back of the working class in the U.S. in
two
decades. As is likely to be the case for many other poor and working
people
faced with dwindling economic futures--linked to de-industrialization,
outsourcing, ruthless competition for cheaper labor and the national
promise of
perpetual war-- the grocery clerks fought back because they had little
choice.
That their resistance was weak is testimony to their lack of effective
leadership, the education that did not prepare them to fight, and the
absence
of a social movement to support them. 7. What is
the history of
this? Grocery clerks in Southern California are fairly well paid when
compared
to other grocery workers in the US. Their health benefits are not as
good as
the benefits as, say, most k12 teachers, but better than most other
wage
workers---also true of their pensions. This gave the grocery workers
what they
themselves see as a middle-class income, whether that is in fact the
case or
not. Wages of $17.50 per hour, or $35,000 per year, were not uncommon.
The
grocery workers are, for the most part, well trained and hard working,
liked by
customers, and until the strike they worked regular hours and could
make plans
with family, etc---unlike many grocery workers elsewhere who work odd
shifts
that change frequently. 8. The
UFCW rank and file in
Southern California won this qualified status by taking scrappy action
(but not
in the last 20 years) and through support and solidarity from the
Teamsters
Union (Dave Beck ,the gangster-Teamster, had a lot to do with
organizing the
early union on the west coast). The UFCW and Teamsters united those who
did the
work in the stores with those who delivered the milk. The early
affiliates of
the UFCW, like the meat-cutters, were particularly tough. But tough
does not
necessarily translate to truly powerful. Neither the Teamsters nor the
UFCW
based their strength on a conscious work force able to take action.
Rather, the
Teamsters trusted the mob and iconic leaders. The UFCW tagged along. 9. The
thrust of UFCW and
Teamster activity on the west coast was, for the most part, to organize
the
bosses, not the workers. UFCW and Teamster leaders, through threats of
mob
force and occasional mass action, won concessions from the ownersCwhile many UFCW members never even knew
they belonged
to a union (unlike the Teamsters who often worshiped racketeers like
Jimmy
Hoffa and Beck). 10.
Contractual victories
set the western UFCW apart from the rest of the country where low-wage
employers were able to enter the market, eventually shattering the
collective
bargaining contracts in the east and mid-west. On the west coast,
adults earned
a living wage in grocery stores. Elsewhere, grocery clerking is a job
for kids. 11. Action
and unity,
perverse as some of that may have been, changed the lives of grocery
workers,
and the appearance of grocery stores. On-the-job engagements, coercion,
and the
potential solidarity of the Teamsters and UFCW combined produced not
only the
fairly good wage-benefit base for UFCW members, but they also caused
the
geography of grocery stores to shift, away from storefronts, retreating
well
back to more easily defended stores surrounded by open and hard to
defend
private space. 12. The
ability to control
the work place, in essence to open or close it and to control the
minute by
minute practices on the site, amounts to the daily struggle between
workers and
bosses. While the Teamsters often complained that they were key
to the UFCW=s victories,
the two unions did deliver in a sense.
They exerted, occasionally, the ability to open and close the
groceries, or
their delivery arteries, and so they won modest gains, though they
typically
gave up the issue of the daily operation of the stores as a Amanagement prerogative,@ as is the habit of US labor. 13. Absent
the struggle to
control the minutiae of daily production, however, owners were
empowered to
make grocery labor nearly vanish. Not long ago, labor in the food
market was
easy to see. Customers either met a one-stop grocer who took orders,
obtained
the goods, and cashed them out, or they went to the meat-cutter, the
baker,
etc., and interacted for their purchases. Sides of beef were right in
the
customer=s eyes. The
connection of nature, work, commodity
exchange, and consumption was fairly easy to make. 14. Now,
in some stores,
even check-out is self-service, meaning labor in the grocery store is
almost
entirely out of sight. Human production has disappeared. People
interact only
with things. The division of labor is sharpened as an army of
supervisors,
using the latest technology, watch over a
work force
whose jobs are reduced to the smallest possible operations. The shopper enters aisles of dazzling
aromatized spectacles, choices, about one fundamentally similar option
after
another, each declaring itself to be a form of freedom, each designed
with
meticulous care to separate the free shopper from her/his capital. The
consumer
buys a box, Captain Crunch, not a relation of production (Gilmore). 15. It is
fairly easy to
hide steel production. It is a remarkable achievement to erase both
nature and
the humanity of work in a grocery store. To do that with the active
cooperation
of the organization that represents the interests of the work force is
doubly
impressive. 16. All of
the UFCW=s sharpest
struggles happened during the period of US
capital's expansionBup to around 1975. Therefore, the outlook
of the
Teamsters and the UFCW, which is the outlook of the entire labor
movement today
(and has been for about 90 years with only slight shifts)
did not completely undermine the effort for more pay, though it
conceded most
of daily operations decisions to the employers. Capital expanded. So
did the
wages of some sections of the work force. Then US capital entered a
decline,
now a dive. 17. Big
Labor=s outlook,
simply, is this: The unity of business,
government, and labor, together in the national interest. This is the
stated
position of the NEA and the American Federation of Teachers (called New
Unionism) and is the position of the entire AFL-CIO ("Partners in
Production"). There is really nothing new in it at all, although it
does
coalesce in distinct form from time to time. It can be called "company
unionism" in some eras, or a part of Mussolini's corporate-fascist
state
in others. 18. Since
its founding, the
fundamental belief of the AFL has always been to defend US capitalism.
This
ideology was tested and solidified before and during WWI when the AFL
loudly
proclaimed its patriotism. The AFL opposed anarchists and communists who called
the war an imperialist war, and the AFL opposed the Russian Revolution.
The AFL
supported the Palmer Raids, and the anti-communist outbursts in the US
following WWI. <http://digital.library.arizona.edu/bisbee/docs/002.php> 19. This is the
ideology of all US unionism, class collaboration, which by logical
extension is
rooted in opportunism, racism, sexism, nationalism, support for
imperialist
expansion, and hierarchy. As a chosen part of the processes of capital,
the
unions echo it. 20. The AFL-CIO
believes American workers will do better if foreign workers do worse.
Support
for U.S. corporations, per the AFL-CIO, means money in U.S. workers=
pockets. Other than the unforgettable
outbursts of the Industrial Workers of the World (AThe
working class and the employing class
have nothing in common@)
and the Communist Party inspired
Congress of Industrial Organizations (leaders of the 1930's sit-down
strikes,
etc., whose militancy and anti-racism was undermined by their own
reformism);
this set of ideas, which translate into practice, is what the U.S.
labor
movement is. People who join unions because they believe they have
opposing
interests with their employers eventually find that their unions do not
agree. 21. For some
workers, the collaborationist view played out well for awhile; white
skilled craftsmen
for example, who could buy snowmobiles and cottages. Over time, the
partnership
ploy failed. Today, the fastest growing sector of the labor movement is
prison
guards, reflecting the AFL-CIO=s
acceptance of railroad boss Jay Gould=s
vision: AI
can get one half of the working class to kill the other half.@
22. The AFL and,
later, the CIO did little to fight racism and sexism, opposed
internationalism,
and wedded their leaders to the ruling class in the US. This left the
working
class divided by class, race, and nation. When finance capital took
full
control of the US ruling class, meaning that they lost interest in
national
production, chased chance for an extra buck through outsourcing (and
sometimes,
as in Enron, produced nothing but just looted );
the
Labor Movement was utterly disarmed, only able to cling to dues income
in hopes
of preserving union staff pensions. 23. The current
condition of the working class, decimated and more than
organizationally
defenseless, speaks for itself. The United Auto Workers union, once the
spear-point of North American labor, lost more than one million members
in the
last 20 years---and did nothing but organize concessionsBunder
the promise that concessions save
jobs. The largest local in the UAW is not made up of auto-workers
anymore, but
State of Michigan employees, an independent union that sought UAW
affiliation
after the Michigan Education Association refused them entry, because
they were
not teachersBMEA
conceding to the UAW continued
control of state politics. 24. The
collaborationist standpoint also explains why the AFL-CIO spends nearly
one-half of its dues income outside of the US, working with US
intelligence
agencies through the National Endowment for Democracy, the American
Institute
for Free Labor Development, and other front groups; destroying
indigenous
left-labor organizations, using both the carrot and the stick, in order
to prop
up US imperialism. The American Federation of Teachers plays a
leadership role
in this activity, supplanting what was the role of AFSCME before the
election
of Jerry Wurf now quite some time ago.
However, this
kind of labor imperialism influences every major union, including the
NEA and
the UFCW, and in many cases sets their course of action. The web sites
of the
affiliates of the AFL-CIO are awash with patriotic praise for the
current oil
wars. AFL assistance to US intelligence agencies goes back to their
support of
WWI, and their willingness to turn in those who disagreed (Billings,
p116;
Scott, Scipes). Perhaps an equally
powerful
demonstration of the subservience of US union leaders to the empire is
what
they did not do: they never organized the massive military, or even
tried. 25. The grocery
workers did not know the history of their class, their unions, and did
not
understand the circumstances that forced them to fight. This had a lot
to do
with their loss, and the ease of the betrayal. 26. Let us come
into this from another angle. What should have the rank and file of the
UFCW
known before they went on strike? 27. They should
have known that this would be a bitter fight. Their employers would
pull out
all the stops. Walmart would be a serious
challenge
to the employers who understand that the source of their profits (their
life
blood and their sole ethic) is exploiting labor. 28. The UFCW
rank and file should have known that every false division in their
ranks would
be exploited by their employers, dividing to rule. Women make up the
majority
of the grocery workers now, and a significant number of them are Latinas, Hispanics, and Black women. No women
appeared in
the visible leadership of the UFCW during the strike. 29. They should
have known their leaders would likely betray them, as had the labor
leaders of
every major struggle of the last 30 years, from Hormel to the Detroit
Newspaper
strike and all in between. They should have known their labor mis-leaders shared one key thing in common with
the grocery
owners: neither party wanted a mass, class conscious group of workers
on their
hands. <http://www.pipeline.com/%7Ergibson/IWWCHEST.html>
30. This history
of betrayal would mean that the workers should have know that they
would need
their own organizational structure, an inclusive and democratic
structure,
drawing in as voting members people from the community, other jobs,
students;
and a cadre of dedicated leaders. The grocery bosses aligned themselves
as an
organized class. The workers=
response would need to match the play. 31. The UFCW
workers needed to know that, despite appearances to the contrary, their
struggle would be an international struggle. UFCW, and many US unions,
have
relied on the idea that they only had to organize the US work force.
This
appeared to be effective in grocery stores, since consumers are
unlikely to
out-source their shopping to Mexico. However, the work force in the
stores, as
well as many of the shoppers today, is truly an international,
multi-racial
group, sometimes working in stores whose diminishing, narrow, tasks are
segregated by race and language. But the key leadership of the strike
could
well have come from these most oppressed sections of the working class,
some of
whom may well have had a lot more experience in labor strife than their
US
counterparts. 32. The workers
should have known that the law is there to guarantee that they lose;
that they
would need to break it. They should have known that to win the strike
would not
only require civil strife, but the support of an active, conscious
community
that understood what they were doing and why they were doing it. All
would need
to rise with all. They should have understood that pacifism in this
strike
would probably mean a loss. 33. The rank and
file should have known that there is nearly no one left in the AFL-CIO,
or the
NEA, who actually knows how to lead a strike, and of that handful,
nearly no
one who has ever really led one. For the last 25 years and more the
AFL-CIO
just organized one series of concessions after the next. The labor
bosses in
power now are habituated to losing, and are unable to make strategic
estimates
and tactical plans for a fight, even if they wanted to fight--and they
do not
want to fight as that might interrupt dues income and their coming
pensions.
Even if the UFCW drew on the widely proclaimed vast resources of the
AFL-CIO
for this strike, the arsenal was empty. 34.
Unfortunately, it is clear that the work force understood none of this,
had
learned nothing from the period following the 1981 PATCO strike (when
newly-elected Ronald Reagan was allowed to smash the air-controllers
strike by
the inaction of the AFL-CIO). 35. That the
UFCW members did not know any of this is testament to the US
educational system
which manages to train people to overlook the obvious, to become instruments of their own
oppression--even to desire itBand
to search for someone else to save
them, to tell them what to do. The decisive viewpoint that Aall
of history is the history of class
struggle,@
is obliterated in US schools, as is the
base-point of learning anything: you can understand and change your
world. 36. As
significant, however, is the success of US public schooling in
extinguishing
coherent rational critical examination of specific circumstances, in
their
historical context, inside an educational situation so thoroughly
segregated,
and segmented, that few notice their sequestration. 37. San Diego
State student-researchers, in the first two weeks of November 2003,
surveyed
120 striking workers. Of those who would speak to the students at any
length
(91), 87 attended US public schools, 77 of them in California. 49 of
the
strikers had attended a California community college or university. 9
had
attended universities or community colleges outside California, but in
the US. 38. Of the 120
strikers interviewed, none were aware of any radical or reformist
groups
operating in the US labor movement. In answer to the question, ADo you know of any groups in
the labor
movement that are working to change it for radical or revolutionary
reasons?@
every striker
said, ANo.@
None had ever heard of the Industrial Workers of the
World, nor of ALabor
Notes@,
nor of Teamsters for a Democratic Union. 39. The absence
of knowledge of the history or presence of the left would have to be
considered
when interrogating the strikers=
knowledge. 40. While
criticism of the survey from a variety of angles would be quite fair,
it is
reasonable to extrapolate from the survey and from a modest grasp of
the
sociology of demographics, that the vast majority of the strikers
attended US
public schools, and the vast majority of those attended California
public
schools, now widely recognized as one of the worst school systems in
the USCbut
once seen as the finest free public
education system in the world. <http://www.pbs.org/merrow/tv/ftw/intro.html> 41. The
schooling the strikers received was a-historical, uncritical, and uncontextualized. More important than the
erasure of the
understanding that, Aall
of history is the history of class
struggle,@
perhaps even more damaging than the
elimination of methods of rational thinking, is the school success in
causing
students to believe that there is no systematic way to comprehend the
world, no
way to discover their place in it, and no way to influence the course
of their
own livesCa
partial explanation of the
despairing search for others to
tell them what to do. <http://www.pipeline.com/~rgibson/Outfoxing.htm> 42. If the
critical questions raised above had not been addressed and at least
partially
answered; the workers should not have gone on strike. There was no
question
that a fight was at hand. No one in such a fight--which in some cases
was
literally a fight for survival--should engage that battle determined to
obey
the lawBchoosing
to lose before the fight is
begun. Anyone wedded to obedience should not go on strike, and should
lose---without the fight. With the fight, but without fighting, the
UFCW rank
and file wound up with what was on the bargaining table the day they
first went
out. They lost everything they failed to fight for, they lost six months=
pay, they demonstrated to all employers
the weakness of US labor, and set up the rest of the working class for
another
attack. 43. The only
redeeming thing about the strike comes through a critical examination
of it as
a failure. Even mis-guided resistance is
more
instructive than passivity. 44. The
rank and file accepted their leaders analysis of the
terrain: social, economic and political conditions before the strike.
Therefore, they accepted their leaders
strategy and
tactics. UFCW bosses believed that this could be a relatively short
strike,
that they could count on the Teamsters at Thanksgiving (about five
weeks into
the strike) to disrupt grocery traffic, and that they could manufacture
an
acceptable sellout (after prancing the rank and file on picket lines a
bit,
giving them a taste of some hardship and a chance to shout, etc.)
shortly after
that. Only the closest insidersBperpetrators--know
the reality, but
second-tier UFCW insiders say this is true. 45. The rank and
file of the union did not fully know the issues of the strike until the
strike=s
last week. They could not explain those
issues to the community. They trusted their leadersBlocating
their power not in the
well-informed potential of masses of people, but in leaders whose
material
lives are significantly better than the lives of the rank and file, and
who
benefit from the ignorance of the rank and file and of the people as a
whole. 46. Trust in the
leaders may extend from a consumer perspective,
that is a vending machine view, of unions (AI
paid my dues so act for me@)
that is encouraged by the leadership;
giving them a chance to display the reasons for their privileges: time
away
from the job, extra pay and benefits, more interesting work, etc. Each
side
alienates the other, each participates; the workers lose. 47. Most labor
bosses prefer to negotiate in secret. Behind a veil of protecting the
alleged
delicacy of negotiations; they can manufacture sellouts more easily
that way.
Keeping the rank and file in the dark about the issues in order to
preserve the
secrecy of the bargaining guaranteed that people in the community, who
had a
lot to lose should the strike be defeated, did not know what the strike
was
about. 48. The rank and
file was left with mis-leaders, who did
not grasp the
real circumstances and had a stake in deception, pretending that they
were the
only ones who could understand the real circumstances. 49. The UFCW
leadership also underestimated the level of support in the community,
interestingly enough. They believed support would be minimal, when in
fact
support turned out to be considerable--depending in part on the
demographics of
the surrounding community. 50. Within the
confines of their small sample, San Diego State University
student-researchers
concluded that people over 50, but under
70, boycotted
the stores during the strike, while stores near university campuses
that
advertised beer bargains were packed with college students. In any
case,
despite nearly no understanding of the specific issues of the strike,
people in
conservative southern California stayed out of the grocery stores in
droves,
costing the companies millions according to their own records. 51. The rank and
file counted on their local elected political officials to help them
out. Time
after time, rank and filers were regaled by political leaders at UFCW
rallies,
promising to stick by them to the endCas
long as they obeyed the law. 52. The UFCW
leadership worried, however, that radicals from universities and
communities
might try to influence the strikers on the picket lines, so they
directed
picket captains and the rank and file to beware of outsiders, to refuse
to
speak about specifics of the strike (details the strikers didn=t
know anyway), and to send any potential
supporter to be cleared by a union leader. San Diego State
student-researchers,
most of them elementary education majors, reported being told to go home, to
stay off the picket lines, unless there was a UFCW sponsored rally,
when they
would be welcome. But they would not be welcome to speak at the rally,
where
only properly vetted speakers would be honored. 53. Striker
creativity was stifled by the UFCW=s
leadership. Strikers were directed, for
example, to only use the UFCW picket signs on their lines, to ensure
that only
the messsages of UFCW@S
controllers would be expressed. The union leadership considered,
then rejected, the idea of an internet bulletin board open to all
strikers and
the community for comments and suggestions, fearing the open play of
ideas
might challenge their domain. Since it is usually only outside the job
that
people can express their lives in symbolic, graphic ways, strangling
creativity
rebounds on strike activity which could be a celebratory outpouring,
diminishing it to a routinized system, not
unlike
being at workBguaranteeing
that strikers would find no
joy in their resistance, and be less likely to heighten its levels. 54. The strikers
went out with all of this as background. They believed the fearsome
Teamsters
would back them up and that their strike fund was a bottomless pit. 55. What did
happen? 56. Teamsters
solidarity amounted to union truck drivers refusing to drive through
picket
lines, briefly. Instead, the Teamsters drove their trucks up to the
picket
lines, got out, were replaced by a scab driver who
was given
the keys, drove the truck through the lines, emptied the truck, and
returned it
to the waiting Teamster driverBan
odd kind of solidarity. 57. The
Teamsters were concerned that repeated fore-warnings from the grocery
bosses,
and from state and national officials, threats about enforcing
Taft-Hartley
injunctions against coordinated labor action like this (theoretically
illegalCas
was the company=s
mutual revenue-sharing, never
challenged d by the state) might menace their dues income. 58. At
Thanksgiving, the Teamsters did refuse to deliver the trucks to the
stores. The
grocery masters hung tough through the holiday even though their stores
were
only partially stocked, and their stores began to grow filthy. 59. After
Thanksgiving, the Teamsters returned to their formal method of scabbing
by
formally not scabbing. 60. The UFCW
leaders, who thought the grocery bosses might cave in at Thanksgiving,
discovered that they would not. The owners shared profits from their
nationwide
chains and brought in scab managers from all over the US. The united
grocery
owners planned for a real fight from the outset. The UFCW planned for a
mock
battle, shammed unity, and were confused by the intransigence and
solidarity of
the other side. 61. Not long
after Thanksgiving, the Southern California Teamster boss issued an
immortal
thought: AWell,
when things go on this long, the
one with the most money wins anyway.@
Teamster support evaporated. 62. No serious
effort was made to mobilize the ALabor
Movement=s,@
vaunted solidarity (in quotes because
there really is no labor movement in the US: most people, 88%, do not
belong to
unions, and what unions exist, do not move). As with other potential
supporters, people from other unions were routinely turned away from
picket
lines. ABig
Labor,@
was only invited to carefully
controlled, scripted, rallies that were few and far between. 63. UFCW and
Teamster officers did try, briefly, to organize actions at grocery
choke
points, food distribution centers, but they never made an effort to
sustain the
actions, or to hit all ten choke points at once. Their mode of striking
was to
pretend to strike. 64. For example,
for several weeks in the strike, the UFCW lifted its pickets at Ralphs and told people to shop there,
purportedly to split
the employers=
unity. That never worked. The employers
stood solid as a class. The strikers stood isolated, as a union,
divided
internally by their own hierarchyBwith
the union leaders, whose salaries
more than double the rank and files=,
split against the membersBand
externally the union was split from
other unions, and the community. Structurally, the union could not
organize a
class. And the union=s
habits would not allow it. 65. Controlled
pretenses to militancy come from Labor=s
fears about recreating the real mass
militancy that took place during the Detroit Newspaper strikeCviolent
mass pickets determined to stop
scabs, pickets from all kinds of unions, eventually crushed by the
actions of
UAW goon squads and the UAW leaders=
willingness to identify people to the
police. Spectacles of militancy, like carefully orchestrated arrests of
polite
labor leaders in suits, are preferable to the real uprisings of people
who want
to win. Big Labor learned their lesson and, outside of a few wildcat
actions,
genuine militancy has not been replicated. 66. The ideology
of the grocery strike was set up as a family quarrel. The strike
leadership
consistently spoke out on behalf of the grocery owners, praising the
quality of
their mutual mission. Grocery owners took out full-page ads proclaiming
their
devotion to the hard-working employees. Only the grocery owners
themselves knew
they were lying. The UFCW believed it. 67. Labor bosses
do not want a mass conscious rank and file in action, determined to win
real
power: control of work places and communities through direct action,
potentially capable of pointing at the hacks and saying, AWe
do not need another layer of bosses in
our midst.@
Labor bosses do not want class struggle,
let alone class war. They have chosen their side, and they know it.
Class
warfare only exposes them, as traitors. 68. With no
criticism coming from outside the union, or counter-action, the work
force is
defenseless, unable to defend what their fathers and mothers once won.
Unable
to control the processes and products they create, the value at work
they
fashion collectively--and that they must organize to command,
unconscious of
the sources of their considerable powerB-
the workers are taught to rely on paper
contracts, lawyers, and union leadersCanything
but their collective sensible
strengthCas
their line of defense. 69. Labor
leaders know that power is always connected to geography. Workers=
power always has a great deal to do with
where the workers are. But labor leaders do not want to be where the
workers
are, on the shop floor, and they want to appear to be the well-spring
of power.
So they inveigle workers into pipelines of powerlessness, like
grievance
procedures which, at each step, distance workers further and further
from the
work place. Workers are also told their power lies in their ability to
vote, to
influence politiciansCwhen
every lesson of the our historical
moment says, in the words of the former political action director of
the
Florida NEA, AIf
voting mattered they wouldn=t
let us do it.@
No labor organization, or federation of
unions, can out-bribe Walmart. 70. In December
2003, the UFCW bargained massive wage and benefit cuts for its members
in AUnion
Town,@
Detroit, at Farmer Jacks and other storesCnever
notifying their California rank and
file of this hint for their own fate. The Detroit members were told
their
concessions would save jobs. Shortly after the ratification, Farmer
Jacks, Krogers, and other Michigan grocery
chains began closing
stores, laying off hundreds of workers. 71. In January,
the enormous 260,000 member California NEA sent a letter to its members
urging
support for the strike, but the NEA (whose members, school workers, are
clearly
next in line for an assault on health benefits) did next to nothing to
actively
support the strike, to send masses of educators, students, and parents
to
picket lines, or even to offer curricula on the strike to classroom
teachers. 72. In early
February, the AFL-CIO leaders announced they were taking over the
strike from
the locals of the UFCW. The arrival of the AFL-CIO meant, without question, that the
strike was lost, to be sold out. The AFL has sold out every major
workers=
struggle that happened in the 20th
and 21st centuriesBor
tried to and were
beaten back by rank and file action, as in the Great Flint Strike
against GM of
1937. But the AFL-CIO wanted a cloak to cover the sellout, so they
called a few
rallies and a handful of rank and file people got arrested around the
state;
but nothing serious. <http://www.rohan.sdsu.edu/~rgibson/flintstrike.html> 73. The strike
dragged on for more than five months, past Christmas, past February,
when
strike benefits were exhausted. Striker health benefits were cut off,
threatening lives, denying people health benefits and needed
operations.
Strikers lost their homes, moved to other jobs and other states and
gave up
pensions, left vocations they had been in for 20-plus years. 74. Shortly
after, the AFL-CIO and media spokespersons for the union declared that
they had
won something significant in negotiations: they had saved the unionBand
in tough times they had negotiated
some other things too. The full contract was never revealed to the rank
and
file before the ratification vote, but the members by then would have
endorsed
nearly anything. They were exhausted: On strike on October 11 2003, the
strike
was killed on March 1 2004. One striker said, AThey are all thieves, the
companies and the unions. They are
just sticking it to us.@ 75. In April
2004 the UFCW leaders urged their members to, AVote
Kerry!@
to protect
their health benefits. 76. The deal
between the UFCW and the companies includes a two-tier wage system,
with new
employees making about 45 percent less, significant cuts in health
benefit coverages and raised co-pays, it
also defers pension rights
by extending eligibility by about seven years for many people, and more
senior
employees lose the control of their hours of work. It is now clear that
this
makes it possible for employers to shift schedules to give low-tier
employees
more work time, and could turn top-tier employees into part timers. 77. The two-tier
system divides the work force materially, sets up greedy competition,
demolishes the solidarity the rank and file need
to
make or preserve gains. The two-tier system has been ratified in
AFL-CIO
contracts all across the US, including in the auto plants, where the UAW=s
racketeer leaders and the auto bosses
declare themselves partners in production. <http://www.freep.com/money/autonews/uaw28_20040428.htm> 78. This strike,
like the Detroit Newspaper strike before it, and Hormel before that,
and PATCO
before that, demonstrates the utter bankruptcy of the US labor
movement. The
union movement is structurally, morally, ideologically, and politically
unable
to meet the crisis aheadBas
competition heats up within the US,
and between the US and other countries, in the relentless drive for
cheaper
labor. 79. The working
class all over the world faces an intense offensive on the part of
capital, and
the people who represent or ride its processes, capitalists. While the
capitalists
are surely divided against one another (in the largest senseBinternational
oil wars) they know their
real enemy, as the unity of Albertsons, Ralphs, and Vons confirms. The internal
divisions of
capital=s
personifications are secondary to the
class war going on everywhere now. 80. In this
context, as in all of their history, the AFL-CIO unions divided
people--by job,
race, class, and region (the clerks in Northern California, whose
contract
expires in summer 2004, were never called out). Only new, mass,
class-conscious
groups who have an interest in self-actualizing critical rank and file
members
can overcome the severe test ahead. 81. What could
have been different? What might have been done, or considered? 82. The grocery
strike did not have to be lost, even with the huge structural and
ideological
obstacle that the grocery owners, the AFL-CIO, UFCW, and Teamsters
formed.
Things could have gone otherwise, and incipient actions within the
strike,
while really minimal, offer some clues for alternatives. 83. Groups like
the Rouge Forum organized across the barriers of race and job, bringing
high-school and college students to picket lines, offering labor
history
classes to strikers, joining actions on the picket lines. Labor Notes,
a union
reform group based in Detroit, offered monthly (mild) criticism of the
strike
as it went along. 84. Even so,
while there is some value in the scattered disenchantment of the UFCW
rank and
file with their union leaders, it takes four related things to grasp
how the
strike could have been won: (1) an ability to abstractBand
make connections, (2) a sense of
history; and both these combined offer (3) imagination and courage, (4)
to find
pleasure in this activity. 85. The schools
the grocery strikers attended eradicated all that. It must be
reestablished, in
schools and out. 86. The ability
to abstract and make connections allows people to locate themselves in
their
social and historical context. The ability to abstract is like using a
microscope, backing the scope away from an initial object of
observation, to
see related objects nearby, and to see their interactions. Some grocery
strikers
did recognize the pivotal nature of the strike vis
a vis coming attacks on health benefits in
the US, but they
could not make the connection to war, imperialist expansion, an
international
war of the rich on the poor, and the resultant intensifying
impoverishment of
the US working classCthe
incessant struggle for profits that
sets up every move in capitalist society, which denies its motives. Nor
could
they recognize the necessity of on-the-line communal solidarity from
the outset
of the strike, believing their union leaders
mantra
that this was their strike to win (Ollman). 87. A sense of
history would have defended the rank and file from their mis-leaders,
quislings in their ranks. All of US labor history is a history of
leadership
betrayal, opportunism, by union heads and politicians alike. 88.
A recognition of
historical context would have taught the strikers the necessity of
demolishing
racism and sexism in their own ranks, before it could be used to
demolish them.
Overcoming these powerful divisions also may have given the strikers
the wisdom
to accept leadership from minority community peopleCmany
from other nations who have not lost
the practice of resistance. History would have demonstrated to the
strikers
that they had to fight as a class, not as a union. 89. History
would also have helped the strikers see that what appears to be is not
necessarily what is, or what is next. In grocery stores, now, what
appears to
be is that every interaction is an economic interaction, between
things:
commodity/scanner/purchase; and there is truth in that. 90. But history,
showing how things change, can help show that beneath the transaction
are
human, social, relationships, and beneath them are the more fundamental
relationships of workers and bossesB
relationship always rooted in struggle,
always in fluxBnever
settled by one power shift or
another. 91. The party
with the greatest interest to transform the exploitative relationship
to a
humane one, the party that has an interest in the greatest truth, is
the
working class which is always critical but not always revolutionary.
Workers
resist because they must resist. They are critical in practice.
Revolution
requires theoretical reflection on critical practiceCand
a leap of understanding and action
that is not necessarily built into critique. 92. Absent the
ability to abstract and make connections, suffering from the erased
historical
memory that schools produce, the strikers (whose courage could be
measured in
their tenacityBbut
not in their militancy or wisdom)
were unable to imagine a strike being done in different waysBstrategies
and tactics grounded in an
understanding of class war, not a gentlemanly disagreement; the
necessity of
close human communal connections acting above and beyond relying on
union
leaders and politicians. The carnival of pleasure that a strike could
be,
creativity bound to the struggle for the truth, was never approached in
this
strike. Bored picketers counted their minutes on the line, just as they
would
at work. 93. What could
have won the strike? Civil strife, well outside the bounds of the law,
now
nothing but a transparent weapon of the rich; strife that would include
poor
and working people, students, community peopleBall
those who had something to lose from losing this strike, that
is, nearly every working person in the USBorganized
not vertically, as the union
movement is organized, but horizontally, as a class. <http://www.rohan.sdsu.edu/%7Ergibson/OPENLET.htm> 94. The National
Education Association had thousands of members surrounding the strike,
able to
reach easily into communities, trained to educate people, skilled
school
workers often willing to volunteer for the common good as that is the
nature of
their job. It was glaringly clear that teachers would be next in line
for the
attacks on health care. NEA did nothing to mobilize serious action on
behalf of
the strike. 95. But did the
grocery strikers ask for help, or did they assist the teachers in
earlier
struggles? That is of no consequence. Someone must move first, and the
privilege to do so lay with the school work force. Their leaders did
nearly
nothingBand
neither did the rank and file. When
workers wait for someone to initiate what should be a reciprocal cycle
of
solidarity, they forget that the employers are coming, forced to
initiate their
attacks by the requirements of the system that they buy. 96. Civil strife
can take many forms, legal and not: building seizures as in the Great
Flint
Strike, mass marches, teach-ins in high schools and on college
campuses,
door-to-door visits in communities, Freedom Schooling and guerilla
theater on
picket lines, and in homes, coffee-clatches
where
people take note of the barriers in their lives and map ways to
overcome them,
shop-ins as those led by the militant Michigan State Workers Organizing
Committee in the 1970's and >80's when community
organizers and social
workers led masses of welfare recipients, cut-off from aid, who went
grocery
shopping in mass, and by-passed
check-out counters as overwhelmed Detroit cops watched. It takes
nothing to
imagine how to stop scabs driving trucks on expressways at night. 97. Civil strife
is the kind of discord that wins strikes, and carries lessons for
future
actions. Civil strife is beyond unionism structurally, pedagogically,
emotionally, and practically. Civil strife goes beyond the decorum of
parliamentary procedure that is so often used to stifle internal union
debate.
Civil strife storms the platform and urges action. The Detroit teachers=
wildcat strike of the late 1990's was
started by a rank and file educator who rushed the platform in a union
meeting,
grabbed a microphone, shouted, AEveryone
who wants to strike, walk over
there!@
When 90 percent of the meeting walked to
favor a strike, the union leadership was rendered impotent. 98. Civil strife
can also mean a general strike, as in San Francisco of 1934, or an
overthrow of
authority as in the Paris Commune of 1871, the early Russian Soviets,
the 1968
uprisings in France, or the Shanghai Commune, perhaps the high-water
mark of
failed socialism (Singer, Lenin, Lotta,
James, http://www.californiahistory.net/9_pages/hard_strike.htm ). 99. The union
movement, whose leaders tie their privileges and interests to US
capital, will
have none of this. Indeed, they will be formidable enemies, trying to
halt it,
as UAW goon squads did at the wildcat Chrysler Mack Avenue sit-down
strike in
1973. In order to Apreserve
the contract,@
the UAW smashed the health-and-safety
strike of their rank and file members, using iron pipes, numchuks,
baseball bats, violence, and turned their bruised and unconscious
members over
to the police. <http://www.pipeline.com/~rgibson/VincentChinChrysler.htm> 100. Big Labor
is nevertheless a force. Even with just 12% of the US work force in unions, that remains a considerable number. The
NEA and the
AFT combined represent about 3 million school workers, the largest
group of
unionized people in the US by a factor of three, strategically placed
in what
is now the central organizing point of social, political, and economic
life in
North America: schools. School workers, supposedly skilled and somewhat
conscious, have direct contact with the potentially most vital link to
social
struggle, the youthCwhose
class interests are not yet
entirely fixed, but whose realistic interests, hopes, are crushed by
rising
inequality and deepening segregationCand
who must fend off the military
recruiters, ghouls in search of new bodies, at the school house door. 101. However,
the AFL-CIO is a federation of unions which offer virtually no internal
democracy. As two decades of failed effort seeking to elect new leaders
by a
variety of reform groups demonstrates, the AFL-CIO cannot be reformed
from
within. It is worth noting that the radical effort to reform the
AFL-CIO over
the last twenty years has rarely been an effort to instill
self-actualizing
class consciousness in the rank and file via the usual routes of
education,
agitation, direct action, and organization, but has, to the contrary,
sought to
replace one set of corrupt leaders with another set of reformersCwho
frequently became as corrupt as the
people they toppled. <http://www.rohan.sdsu.edu/%7Ergibson/OPENLET.htm> 102.
Nevertheless, the federation=s
unions still have members who control
choke points in society. Dockworkers realistically threatened to shut
down the
oil wars with targeted strikes on the west coast in 2003. Still, they
did not
strike, perhaps indicating the role their leaders play. Even so, with millions of
people in unions, and with no social movement having the resources and
commitment to systematically make choices about what industries its
cadre should
enter, it only makes sense to try to work inside unionsBwhich
many people must join anyway. 103. But the
unions teach people nothing about what they need to know to face the
international attack of the rich on the poor. In unions, people learn
racism,
hierarchy, sexism, subservience, reliance on false leaders,
encapsulated
thinking, spurious pluralism, retreat, mimicking the habits and work
norms of
the employer, privilegeCall
the aspects of voluntary servitude.
Unions are not training grounds for the future---unless leading people
are in
them fighting to go well beyond unionism. And those conscious people
need to be
active over and above unionism. If four toes on one of their feet is in
the
union, the big toe and another foot must be firmly out, in
organizations that
prepare people structurally, pedagogically, emotionally,
intellectually,
habitually, pleasurably, for a serious fight that the unions are unfit
to
engage. 104. To simply
support the Labor Movement is to support a romanticized myth of what
never was.
US trade unions are the result of the social relations that gave birth
to them.
Those social relations are rooted in exploitation, racism, sexism, the
division
of labor (especially mental and manual labor in which the employer
seeks to
replace the mind of the employee with the mind of the boss) and
imperialism.
The unions were never formed to overturn that relationship. In the US
today,
class conscious unionism is banned by the bureaucracy. It is no
mistake, only
logical, that US unions look like clear-cut mirror images of those
relationships within their particular industries. 105. To just
want to defend the unions is to want to defend those social relations,
if to make
them more humane; but within the capsule of the outlook of house slavesBand
those who want to become
them--opportunistic to the core. 106. Perhaps
this was best summed up by a California Teamster leader in May, months
after
the southern California grocery strike. In warning Northern California
grocery
workers about the employers=
power, he reiterated, ALook,
they have all the money, and that
is what is key.@
107. As long as
the social relations of capital, the Master/Slave domination that
capitalism is,
persist, he is right. His outlook is the logical outcome of US
unionist, and
reformist, thinking. The working class has no money, no property, by
definition; so they lose. 108. The crux of
the capitalist system is the private appropriation of social labor. We
work.
They gain. The more we work, the more they gain. The more we work and
concede
the knowledge of the processes of our work to them, that is, the more
they can
replace our minds with theirs, the more we enslave ourselves
intellectually and
financially. The more we witlessly participate in this process, the
more we are
divided one from another. The more we do this, the richer they get. 109. However,
once the source of all value is understood--as born in labor--and the
permanence of the Master/Slave relationship rejected; then it becomes
clear
that money does not settle strikes; conscious people acting with deep
solidarity do. 110. Most people
do not want to fight to live. But now they must. Capitalism will not
allow its
work force to be creative, nor to earn a living wage with the benefits
that
mean survivalBnot
even in the locus of its greatest
power: the US. It will not allow people time to make humane connections
with
others. It systematically divides and diminishes all in its reachBnow
flailing at hyper-speed. People will
fight back because they will be required to fight back; for money,
health,
freedom, creativity. They fight to be true to themselves and good to
others,
and perhaps out of hatred for the sheer contemptible venality of capital=s
favorites. 111. Civil
strife in the future is likely. The US invasion of the world, centered
not only
on oil but international social control, is costly. The cost is already
being
shouldered by poor and working people. While no one has a crystal ball,
it is
reasonable to suggest that civil strife will rise up, with increasing
sophistication, in the most exploited communities, especially
communities of
new immigrants and black communities especially those of new immigrants
and
blacks. Early on, it makes sense to guess that much of this will be
spontaneous, as the Mayday 2004 mass actions to shut down the LA ports
and
highways by un-unionized Latino truck drivers demonstrates. They fought
to live
because rising gas prices are starving them. They held signs not only
about gas
prices but: ANo
War!@ <http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la_me_truckers1may01,1,6203047.story>
112. It also
makes sense to believe that students, whose dreams of a better,
meaningful,
life cannot be fulfilled in a collapsed imperial nation, will play a
significant role in resistance. School workers can play a constitutive
role in
all of that. 113. Over time,
with troops spread thin, and the super-military of the US shockingly
unable to
defeat a non-existent army in Iraq, it will be difficult for elites to
quickly
squash multiple rebellions in their home baseCbut
surely not impossible. 114. Now,
Northern California grocery workers are preparing to strike against
their
bosses who will use the sellout contract in the south as their goal in
bargaining. The struggle in Northern California will differ, at least
in form,
from the strike that was lost in the south. The particulars are
somewhat
divergent. For example, the dockworkers, the historic Longshore
Workers Union once led by communist organizers and the iconic Harry
Bridges, is
already involved in the grocery struggle preparations. The dockworkers
bring a certain panache of militancy to the
effort, even though
they themselves were whipped into submission by the containerization of
their
jobs long ago. What is likely to happen
in Northern California, if profound lessons are not learned from the
tragedy in
Southern California, is not a better struggle, but a more sophisticated
spectacle, followed by yet another devastating defeat. This does not
have to
happen, but it will happen, without purposeful intervention. 115. Still, at
its best, spontaneous civil strife, even the ability to control some
work
places and communities through mass action, is not necessarily class
consciousness, and does not necessarily lead to the obvious task at
hand:
overcoming capitalism. Relentless strife does not transcend capitalism.
Indeed,
in some cases it only feeds it. The struggle for cheaper wage labor
thrives on
destruction. (Singer). 116. At a
certain point in the midst of civil strife, which is the logical and
necessary
activity of people who have little or no choice but to fight back in
order to
survive; deeds must mesh with reflection; a conscious collective
self-examination that perhaps cannot occur without social
practice, but is
vital to the mass change of mind that must underpin any kind of
sustainable
social change for equality and democracy, intertwined. The
base for that needs to be begun now. People must be won to fight
and
sacrifice for a way of life they have never lived, and only imagined. 117. Here is how
Bertell Ollman
sets this
up: "First, workers must
recognize that they have interests. Second,
they must be able to see their interests as individuals in their
interests as
members of a class. Third, they must be able to distinguish what Marx
considers
their main interests as workers from other less important economic
interests.
Fourth, they must believe that their class interests come prior to
their
interests as members of a particular nation, religion, race, etc.
Fifth, they
must truly hate their capitalist exploiters. Sixth, they must have an
idea,
however vague, that their situation could be qualitatively improved.
Seventh,
they must believe that they themselves, through some means or other,
can help
bring about this improvement. Eighth, they must believe that Marx's
strategy,
or that advocated by Marxist leaders, offers the best means for
achieving their
aims. And, ninth, having arrived at all the foregoing, they must not be
afraid
to act when the time comes"
http://www.pipeline.com/%7Erougeforum/towardclassconsciousness.htm 118. A mass change of mind,
even in the
midst of civil uprisings, however, is unlikely to occur, and will not
find
sufficient power to sustain itself, without organization. The mirror
images of
the failure of any spontaneous reform movement to transcend capitalism
and the
abject failures of Russian and Chinese socialism (perhaps more than the
working
class finding itself nationalized, but only a little more), leads not
only to
the question, AWhat
must people do in order to be
free?@,
but also to the deeper question, AWhat must people know, and how
must they come
to know it, in order to rip freedom from necessity, in order to
preserve
what they have wonBand
yet to wittingly modify it?@
119. All that is necessary
for all people
to lead reasonably free, creative, connected, communal, egalitarian
lives is
right before us, now. All we have to do is decide to share, to change
our minds
about how we want to liveCand
shove aside those whose privileges
cause them to disagree. It is easier, and harder, than it sounds. 124. One week after the end
of the
strike, San Diego State student-researchers went to local grocery
stores and
surveyed 34 former strikers at work. It was necessary for the students
to
separate former strikers from others (some of them former scabs, some
just new
employees), as a good deal of turnover appeared to have taken place. Of
those
ex-strikers who were surveyed, 27 said they had won something in the
strike. Of
that group, 19 said the only thing they won was, AWe saved our union.@
Selected
Sources Freire, P. (2000). Pedagogy
of Freedom. Rowman and Littlefield:
New York. Gibson, R. (1980) The
struggle for the shorter work week, online at http://www.pipeline.com/~rgibson/ShorterWorkWeek.html Gilmore, Paul (April 2004). Interview
at CSU-Fresno. James, C.L. R. (1946). On the paris commune online
at http://www.revolutionary‑history.co.uk/James/james1.htm Lenin, V. I. The
paris
commune. Online at
http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/pariscommune/lenincommune.html
ukacs, G. (2000). A defense
of history and class consciousness; tailism
and the
dialectic. Verso: New York. Marx, K. (1983). Poverty
of philosophy. New York: International Publishers (p196). Ollman, B. (2000) Dance of the
dialectic.
University of Illinois: Chicago. Scipes, K. (2003). AFL refuses to
clear the
air, online at Labor Notes,
http://www.labornotes.org/archives/2004/02/articles/b.html Scott, J. (1980). Yankee
unions go home.
Toronto: Black Star. Scott, J. (1987). A
communist life. Toronto: Black Star. Serrin, W.
(1973). The company and the
union. Knopf: New York. Singer, D. (2002). Prelude
to revolution. South End Press: Chicago. Addendum A Labor Studies
Bibliography: http://www.pipeline.com/~rgibson/laborstudiesbiblio.htm The Rouge Forum: www.Rougeforum.org
For an opposing view written
by a union
reformer, see: Michael Yates, Why Unions Matter. See also the
online
publications of ALabor
Notes,@
online at http://www.labornotes.org/ The debate between social
historians and
more traditional historians, vis
a vis their method of constructing labor
history and
especially the history of the CPUSA, is summarized in Jack Scott, A
Communist Life (p5). The fact that the US labor
movement was
steeped in especially powerful forms of racism from its inception may
be
related to the unique development of the US, in that slavery and Jim
Crow
located a semi-colonized work force within the US, as distinct
from,
say, the British imperial system. This may have deepened the
internalization of
a sense of supremacy within the white (and usually male) skilled work
force,
yet at the same time located a profound wisdom and necessity for
struggle
within parts of the black community which, as W.E.B Dubois, James
Baldwin, Eric
Foner, James Boggs, and others have
demonstrated, has
been pivotal for social change in the US. See especially Boggs= Racism
and the Class Struggle. This key division of the US workforce is
treated as
a superficial aberration, at best, by the AFL-CIO which has
consistently
betrayed even the electoral actions of the black community (See Robert
Moses, Radical
Equations). The debate between those who
believe in
spontaneous organization and a rather organic coming to consciousness
in the
working class, and those who believe that external organizations of
professional cadre is sometimes set up as a debate between Lenin=s
What Is to be Done, and all
comers, from Rosa Luxembourg to Raya Dunayevskaya and many in between. There is an
exhaustive
bibliography here: http://www_rohan.sdsu.edu/~rgibson/freirall.htm While I cannot accept the
idea that
people naturally come to understand the whys and hows
to overcome capital and build a new world, neither can I accept Lenin=s
early work which he suggests, in later
writings, was unsophisticated, un-dialectical (Ollman
p43). I think that his self-criticism is correct. The issue remains a
serious
problem today. None-the-less, it is clear to me that Lukacs=
key point, that consciousness must have
an organizational form, is correct. Special thanks to David Siar, Greg Meyerson,
and Amber
Goslee for their editorial help. Rich Gibson
May 9 2004 |