Grenada - 30 Years

Documents recently released under the 30 year rule conclusively defeat the justifications put forward by the US Government for the invasion of Grenada and seriously bring into question the legality of the invasion by the forces of the USA and the Organisation of eastern Caribbean States. The main justifications given at the time for the invasion were: -

That a request for assistance had been made by the then Governor General Sir Paul prior to the invasion,
That Grenada was a potential threat to other islands in the Region,
That the invasion was necessary to assist in restoring order to the island.

It is undoubtedly the case that at some point Sir Paul Scoon wrote a note seeking assistance to the then Prime Minister of Barbados, however the released documents show that this note was written after the invasion not before it. In a letter dated 14th November 1983 to the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP, the then Foreign Secretary, the High Commissioner to the West Indies Giles Bullard advises “His letter to Adams, dated 24th October, is not on Government House stationary, and Adams himself says it was taken to Sir Paul for signature by Brigadier Lewis of the Barbados Defence force, who did not land in Grenada until late on 25th. This attempt to give the intervention a retrospective legality reflects no credit on those concerned.” Again, in a document entitled “Secret UK Eyes Alpha” dated 28th October 1983 it is stated “On 27th October Mr Adams showed the High Commissioner the Governor Generals letter, dated 24th October, requesting Mr Adam’s help is stabilising this grave and dangerous situation and referring to Sir Paul’s desire to see a peacekeeping force established in Grenada to facilitate a rapid return to democratic rule. The High Commissioner believes that the signature is genuine, but the date is almost certainly false.”

A Foreign Office telegram sent in November 1983 indicates in response to the question was there a call for help from Sir Paul Scoon that “Our Deputy High Commissioner saw the Governor General in Grenada last Sunday “just before the invasion” he communicated no call for help whatsoever and as you know, no call was made through us nor indeed, I understand from the statement from the palace, no call was made through the Monarch….There was no call through the British Government nor, as I understand , through the Head of State before the invasion.”

There is further evidence of the retrospective nature of the signature in a US telegram number 3184 dated 28th October which makes reference to sending Larry Rossin, a desk officer in the State Department, who entered Grenada in a landing craft or helicopter and went to the Governor General’s residence under military escort to obtain the signature on the letter from Sir Paul Scoon. It is highly improbable that this could have occurred prior to the invasion on25th October.

Could it be argued that Grenada was posing a threat to its neighbours? Grenada is a small island, at the time of the invasion the population was around 100,000 people, and the Government possessed no navy or air force. The US propaganda at the time claimed that the airport that was currently under construction at Port Salines was not as claimed a civil airport to facilitate a growth in tourism but was in fact a military installation which was intended for use in the region by Cuba. It is the case that Cuban workers were involved in the construction of the airport, but the main contactor was the UK company Plessey who issued a statement on 1st November 1983 which has been included in the released documents. The statement indicates: -

“in view of the many statements which have been made, some with little basis in fact, about the military potential of the Point Salines airport, the following facts are relevant. The airport was designed to facilitate the economic development of Grenada, especially with regard to tourism. It would enable direct international flights by wide-bodied jets to Grenada without transfer through other Caribbean countries. It was also designed to satisfy a diversionary airport requirement for other Caribbean countries including Trinidad. The runway is 9000 feet long by 150 feet wide and is designed to the standards and practices of the International Civil Aviation Organisation. It would enable a Boeing 747 with a full load short of 7 passengers to take off for a flight direct to London. Fully compatible runways exist in Antigua, Jamaica, St Lucia and Barbados where the runway is 11,000 feet long.

Navigational equipment does not include radar. Prevailing climactic conditions in Grenada allow Visual Flying Rules for most of the year. A military airbase would require the following facilities, none of which exist at Port Salines :-
Parallel taxiway
Arrangements for dispersed parking
Radar
Hardened aircraft shelters for protection against bomb blast
Secure fuel farm (i.e. Underground)
Underground weapons storage
Surface air missile sites or other anti-air defence
Perimeter security
Operational readiness platform with rapid access
Aircraft engineering workshops and major stores
Aircraft arrester gear.

Remarkably, having used the issue of the airport to justify the invasion, a confidential telegram from November 1983 makes it clear that having invaded the US were now strongly considering completing the airport project and that the UK Government was reminding them of Plessey’s interests. However, it was made clear that Plessy was unpopular because of their publicly expressed insistence that the airfield was to be used solely for tourism and their continued criticism of the US intervention.

There is no evidence contained in the documents that show that foreign nationals, or indeed Grenadians, were in any danger. One foreign office indicates “in international law it is justifiable to go in and rescue citizens if they are in danger. I cannot speak for American Citizens, I can only say that our Deputy High Commissioner went in last Sunday, saw the Governor General and understood that British citizens at that time were not in danger.” In his letter to Sir Geoffrey Howe , Giles Bullard indicates “in the five days allowed to it the members of the RMC took pains to present themselves at home and abroad as professional soldiers who had intervened to preserve law and order and were not interested in political power. Invitations to visit Grenada and see the situation for themselves were sent to non-resident Ambassadors and High Commissioners. Announcements were made that a broad based cabinet would be appointed, that lives and property of foreign nationals in Grenada would be protected, that tourism would be encouraged and that good relations would be continued with those countries with which Grenada has diplomatic relations, including the United States. Similar assurances were given to my Deputy, David Montgomery, when he met major Leon Cornwall, one of the three Vice-Chairmen of the RMC, in St George’s on 23rd October to negotiate the evacuation of British citizens wishing to leave the island. ……It is I suppose possible that the RMC might have taken some hostages as a precaution against invasion, but though they had the opportunity they did not do so, nor were any US Citizens harmed in the five days of spasmodic fighting that followed the invasion. Some of those rescued, mostly students from the medical crammer near the airport said that they felt most at risk on the morning of the invasion.”

Documents that were written on the Island just prior to the invasion show that the RMC were in regular contact with Sir Paul Scoon and at a meeting held on 22nd October it was made clear that RMC was a holding operation until a broad based civilian Government could be formed within 14 days and named individuals are proposed; these did not include any of the RMC member or Bernard Coard. In response, the Governor general agreed with the need to form such a Government and agreed to speak to some of those individuals proposed for membership. He also indicates that he sees no needs for an invasion, which could only lead to a loss of life and cause great damage to the country. He therefore promised to contact the heads of government in the region making it clear that the situation was under control, that the Council was willing to receive representatives from their Governments to observe the situation in Grenada and that the Council would be actively seeking discussions with the Americans on the situation in Grenada. This seems to accord with the advice expressed by Giles Bullard.

The released documents show without doubt that there was no invitation from the Governor General to provide assistance, the letter of invite was written and signed after the invasion had taken place. They also show that there was no threat to the other islands in the region, nor was there any threat to foreign nationals nor indeed local Grenadians. The intention to form a broad based civilian Government is clear, and this is of course what happened after the invasion. In the circumstances, the legality of the invasion must be seriously brought into question.