THE SUPREME COURT OF GRENADA

AND THE WEST INDIES ASSOCIATED STATES

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

(CIVIL)

HIGH COURT

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10 OF 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY

BERNARD COARD AND OTHERS FOR REDRESS

PURSUANT TO SECTION 16 OF THE SAID

CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA FOR

CONTRAVENTION OF SECTIONS 3, 5 AND 8 THEREOF

IN RELATION TO THEM

BETWEEN:

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

APPELLANT

AND

BERNARD COARD, CALLISTUS BERNARD,

LESTER REDHEAD, CHRISTOPHER STROUDE,

HUDSON AUSTIN, LIAM JAMES, LEON CORNWALL,

JOHN ANTHONY VENTOUR, DAVE BARTHOLOMEW,

EWART LAYNE, COLVILLE MCBARNETTE,

SELWYN STRACHAN, AND CECIL PRIME

RESPONDENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY WRITTEN ARGUMENTS

Of Bernard Coard and Ewart Layne

Against the Application

For a Stay Of Execution

Of The Order

Of The Honourable Justice Kenneth Benjamin

1. The arguments dated Tuesday 13^th April 2004 and filed on April 15^th 2004 were prepared without the benefit of the written judgement. Having had the benefit of reading the written judgement we add the following:

(i) At paragraph 13(vii) of the aforementioned arguments dated 13^th April we state that the Learned Trial Judge accepted the Appellant’s argument that it is sufficient that there is a nexus between the sentence of the Court and the sentence in effect for the detention to be in execution of the sentence of a court per Section 3(1) of the Constitution. In fact the judge did not give a view on this argument of the Appellant [See Paragraph 56 of Judgement]. The fact that the judge did not express a view makes no difference to our argument. But please read paragraph 13 of the written arguments aforesaid with the correction stated herein in mind.

(ii) Weeks v. UK referred to by the Appellant in his argument in the court below [see paragraph 56 of his judgement], dealt with the issue of the lawfulness of detention of a prisoner whose licence was revoked. The issue was whether the detention of the prisoner after the revoking of his licence was in execution of a sentence of a court. This is a different issue from the instant case which issue is whether Section 72(1) of the Constitution confers on the executive the power of sentence. At paragraph 56 of his judgement the Learned Trial Judge made it clear that this was the issue.

(iii) The Learned Trial Judge “did not dispute that the Governor General may have considered the sentences imposed on the three other co-accused convicted of manslaughter” [paragraph 56 of judgement]. This argument was put forward by the Appellant. But this argument served to emphasise that what the Governor General carried out in imposing imprisonment for the remainder of natural life as a condition to the pardon, was the classical sentencing function of determining the severity of punishment.

(iv) The Learned Trial Judge determined the case on the fairly narrow basis that in drawing a distinction between imprisonment for the remainder of natural life and imprisonment for life simpliciter, the Governor General envisaged a choice of punishment. He exercised the choice by imposing imprisonment for the remainder of natural life in some cases and imprisonment for life simpliciter in other cases. The exercise of that choice rendered the punishment of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life unlawful [see paragraph 58 of judgement]. It is submitted that it is hopeless to seek to fault this finding of law by the Learned Trial Judge.

__________________

Bernard Coard

__________________

Ewart Layne

Friday April 16^th 2004